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Abstract
Concerning the solution theory for set games, the paper focuses on a family of solutions,
each of which allocates to any player some type of marginalistic contribution with respect
to any coalition containing the player. Here the marginalistic contribution may be inter-
preted as an individual one, or a coalitionally one. For any value of the relevant family,
an axiomatization is given by three properties, namely one type of an eciency property,
the substitution property and one type of a monotonocity property. We present two proof
techniques, each of which is based on the decomposition of any arbitrary set game into
a union of either simple set games or elementary set games, the solutions of which are
much easier to determine. A simple respectively elementary set game is associated with
an arbitrary, but xed item of the universe respectively coalition.
Keywords: set game, solution theory, value, axiomatization
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1 Concepts and Introduction
Let U , called the universe, denote an abstract set which is xed throughout the remainder.
Following the introductory papers [1] (chapter 7), [2], [3], [6], a set game is a pair hN; vi,
where N is a nonempty, nite set, called player set, and v : 2N ! 2U is a characteristic
mapping, dened on the power set of N , satisfying v(;) := ;. Let G denote the space of all
set games with an arbitrary player set, whereas GN denotes the space of all set games with
reference to a player set N which is xed beforehand. An element of N (notation: i 2 N)
and a nonempty subset S of N (notation: S  N or S 2 2N with S 6= ;) is called a player
and coalition respectively, and the associated set v(S)  U is called the worth of coalition S,
to be interpreted as the (sub)set of items from U that can be obtained (are needed, preferred,
owned) by coalition S if its members cooperate. Given a set game hN; vi and a coalition S,
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we write hS; vSi for the sub set game obtained by restricting v to subsets of S only (i.e., to
2S).
Concerning the solution theory for set games, a solution  on G (or on a particular subclass
of G) associates a so-called allocation  (N; v) = ( i(N; v))i2N 2 (2U )N with every set game
hN; vi. The so-called allocation  i(N; v)  U to player i in the set game hN; vi represents the
items that are given, according to the solution  , to player i from participating in the game.
Until further notice, no constraints are imposed upon a solution  on G. The dierence of
two sets A; B  U is denoted by A−B and dened to be A−B := fx 2 A j x 62 Bg.
In Section 2 we introduce a family of solutions called semi{marginalistic values. According to
a semi{marginalistic value, any player’s allocation in a set game is the overall union of appro-
priately chosen marginalistic contributions of the player with respect to coalitions containing
the player. Here the player’s marginalistic contribution may be interpreted in various ways to
allow for a uniform treatment of semi{marginalistic values (see Denition 2.3). The goal of
the paper is twofold: on the one hand, we provide an axiomatization of any semi{marginalistic
value in terms of three basic properties (global eciency, substitution, and marginalistic con-
tributions monotonicity; see Theorem 3.3), and on the other, we present two proof techniques.
Section 3 is devoted to the rst proof technique which is based on the decomposition of any
set game into a union of so-called simple set games. Each simple set game is associated with
an arbitrary, but xed item, and the worth of a coalition in a simple set game equals either
the empty set or the singleton consisting of the underlying item. Section 4 deals with the
second proof technique which is based on the decomposition of any set game into a union of
so-called elementary set games. Each elementary set game is associated with an arbitrary,
but xed coalition, and the worth of all coalitions, except the xed one, in an elementary set
game equals the empty set. In fact, the decomposition technique is mainly applied to the
marginalistic contribution, the concept of which is treated as a new set game arising from an
initial set game. In the nal Section 5 we discuss the similarities between the two elds of set
game theory and cooperative game theory.
2 Semi-marginalistic values for set games
We review four dierent solutions, studied throughout the solution theory for set games,
before introducing a family of set games solutions containing each one of them. The purpose
of the paper is to present a uniform axiomatization of the new family of solutions.
Example 2.1. For every set game hN; vi 2 G, we say, on the one hand, an item x 2 U is
attainable by player i through a certain coalition S containing i whenever the item belongs
to the coalition’s worth, that is x 2 v(S); on the other hand, we say a coalition T can not
block an item x whenever the item does not belong to the coalition’s worth, that is x 62 v(T ).
(i) The individually marginalistic IM{value, as introduced by [1], allocates those items
that are attainable by player i, but can not be blocked by the coalition consisting of the
remaining members (dierent from player i). To be exact,
IMi(N; v) := [SN;
S3i

v(S)− v(Snfig)

for all i 2 N . (2.1)
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(ii) The overall-individually marginalistic OIM{value, as introduced by [1], allocates those
items that are attainable by player i, but can not be blocked by any subcoalition with
one player less. To be exact,
OIMi(N; v) := [SN;
S3i

v(S)− [j2Sv(Snfjg)

for all i 2 N . (2.2)
(iii) The overall-coalitionally marginalistic OCM{value, as introduced by [10], allocates
those items that are attainable by player i, but can not be blocked by any strict sub-
coalition. To be exact,
OCMi(N; v) := [SN;
S3i

v(S)− [T$Sv(T )

for all i 2 N . (2.3)
(iv) The Driessen{Sun DS{value, as introduced by [5], allocates those items that are at-
tainable by player i, but can not be blocked by any coalition not containing i. To be
exact,
DSi(N; v) := [SN;
S3i

v(S)−

[TNnfig v(T )

for all i 2 N . (2.4)
Among these four solutions, the IM -value is the largest in that the inclusions OCMi(N; v) 
OIMi(N; v)  IMi(N; v) and DSi(N; v)  IMi(N; v) hold for any player i in the set game
hN; vi. In this setting, for any S  N , the underlying expressions v(S) − v(Snfig), v(S) −
[j2Sv(Snfjg) and v(S)−[T$Sv(T ) respectively, are called the marginalistic contribution of
coalition S induced by either one particular member, all members, or all subcoalitions.
Denition 2.2. A semi{marginalistic value  on the set game space G is dened to be one
member out of the family of set games solutions of the following form:
 i(N; v) = [SN;
S3i

v(S) −5vS;i

for all hN; vi 2 G and all i 2 N , (2.5)
or equivalently,
 i(N; v) = [SN;
S3i
MCvS;i where MC
v
S;i := v(S)−5vS;i (2.6)
In words, for every player i, the marginalistic contribution MCvS;i of every coalition S is
determined by the set dierence of the coalition’s worth v(S) and some (yet unspecied)
expression 5vS;i which is supposed to depend, to some weak or strong extent, upon the worths
of a certain collection of coalitions, somehow determined by S and/or i (for instance, through
the unions and/or intersections of a number of (sub)coalitions). By convention, 5vS;i := ; in
the framework of one-person set games.
By (2.1) and (2.4), the IM{ and DS{values are semi{marginalistic values of the form (2.5)
by choosing 5vS;i := v(Snfig) and 5vS;i := [TNnfigv(T ) respectively, the expression of which
still depends upon player i. By (2.2) and (2.3), the overall OIM{ and OCM{values are semi{
marginalistic values by choosing 5vS;i := [j2Sv(Snfjg) and 5vS;i := [T$Sv(T ) respectively,
the expression of which satises the so-called players’ contributions independence.
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Denition 2.3. We say a semi{marginalistic value  of the form (2.5) satises players’
contributions independence whenever, for any coalition S, the associated expression 5vS;i
does not depend upon player i, that is 5vS;i := 5vS is the same for all i 2 N . Shortly,
 i(N; v) = [SN;
S3i
MCvS = [SN;
S3i

v(S)−5vS

for all hN; vi 2 G and all i 2 N ; (2.7)
For reasons that will be explained later: 5vN  [S$Nv(S) (2.8)
For the class of monotonic set games hN; vi (i.e., v(S)  v(T ) for all S  T  N), it was
shown in [1] that the IM{ and OIM{values coincide. So, for every monotonic set game
hN; vi, it holds IM(N; v) = OIM(N; v) = OCM(N; v), whereas, by (2.4), DSi(N; v) =
v(N)− v(Nnfig) for all i 2 N , and consequently, [i2NDSi(N; v) = v(N)−\i2Nv(Nnfig) on
the class of monotonic set games. According to the next lemma, the DS{value diers from
the remaining solutions in that another type of eciency applies.
Lemma 2.4. Let  be a semi{marginalistic value of the form (2.7) assuming players’ contri-
butions independence, such that (2.8) holds. Then  satises the global eciency principle,
that is the solution  allocates all the attainable items to the players in that
[i2N i(N; v) = [SNv(S) for all hN; vi 2 G. (2.9)
Proof of Lemma 2.4.
Clearly, for the semi{marginalistic value  of the form (2.7), its global eciency condition
(2.9) is equivalent to the following condition:
[SNMCvS = [SNv(S) for all hN; vi 2 G. (2.10)
We prove (2.10) by induction on the number of players. The case n = 1 is trivial due to
5vS;i := ; in the framework of one-person set games. Let hN; vi 2 G with n  2. Then we
obtain the following chain of equalities:
[SNMCvS = MCvN [

[S$N MCvS

= MCvN [

[k2N

[SNnfkgMCvS

(2:10)
= MCvN [

[k2N

[SNnfkg v(S)

(by the induction hypothesis)
= MCvN [

[S$N v(S)

(2:6)
=

v(N)−5vN

[

[S$N v(S)

(2:8)
= [SNv(S):
This completes the proof of the global eciency (2.10) for the semi{marginalistic value  . 2
Due to their mutual inclusions, we derive from the global eciency of the OCM{value (by
Lemma 2.4), the global eciency of the OIM{ and IM{values as well, although the latter
one is not of the form (2.7). In addition to the global eciency axiom, we study another
axiom, called substitution property, in order to be able to provide, in the next section, an
axiomatization of any semi{marginalistic value satisfying appropriately chosen marginalistic
contributions.
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Denition 2.5. (Substitutes in a set game and substitution property for a solution)
(i) Two players i 2 N , j 2 N , i 6= j, are said to be substitutes in the set game hN; vi 2 G
whenever it holds v(S [ fig) = v(S [ fjg) for all S  Nnfi; jg.
(ii) We say a solution  on the set game space G possesses the substitution property if
 i(N; v) =  j(N; v) for any pair i 2 N , j 2 N , i 6= j, of substitutes in the set game
hN; vi 2 G. In words, two substitutes in a set game are allocated the same items.
Lemma 2.6. Let  be a semi{marginalistic value of the form (2.7) assuming players’ contri-
butions independence, such that the marginalistic contribution MC concept inherits the role
of substitutes, that is, for any pair i 2 N , j 2 N , i 6= j, of substitutes in the set game hN; vi
MCvS[fig = MC
v
S[fjg or \equivalently", 5vS[fig = 5vS[fjg for all S  Nnfi; jg. (2.11)
Then  satises the substitution property.
Proof of Lemma 2.6.
For any arbitrary pair of players i 2 N , j 2 N , i 6= j, in a set game hN; vi 2 G, it holds
 i(N; v)
(2:7)
= [SN;
S3i
MCvS =

[ SN;
S3i; S3j
MCvS

[

[ SN;
S3i; S 63j
MCvS

=

[ SN;
S3i; S3j
MCvS

[

[SNnfi;jgMCvS[fig

>From this decomposition it follows immediately that, for the equality  i(N; v) =  j(N; v), it
suces to require that MCvS[fig = MC
v
S[fjg for all S  Nnfi; jg. So, the semi{marginalistic
value  satises the substitution property whenever (2.11) holds. 2
It is left to the reader to verify the right-hand side of (2.11) in the framework of the marginal-
istic contribution of every coalition S induced by either all members, or all subcoalitions.
Thus, by Lemma 2.6, the OIM{ and OCM{values possess the substitution property, as it
holds for the DS{value too (cf. [5]) although this latter value is not of the form (2.7). As
a minor contribution, we conclude this section with an alternative, but shortened proof of
the coincidence of the IM{ and OIM{values on the class of monotonic set games (the direct
proof of which is much dierent from the inductive proof by [1], Theorem 2.2, pages 110-111).
Lemma 2.7. IM(N; v) = OIM(N; v) for every monotonic set game hN; vi 2 G.
Proof of Lemma 2.7.
Let hN; vi 2 G be a (monotonic) set game and i 2 N . As noted earlier, by (2.1){(2.2), the
inclusion OIMi(N; v)  IMi(N; v) is always valid since v(Snfig)  [j2Sv(Snfjg) for all
S  N satisfying i 2 S. In order to prove the inverse inclusion IMi(N; v)  OIMi(N; v), it
suces to show that x 62 OIMi(N; v) implies x 62 IMi(N; v).
Suppose x 62 OIMi(N; v). Let S  N with i 2 S. We show x 62 v(S) − v(Snfig). In case
x 62 v(S), then we are done. Without loss of generality, we may assume x 2 v(S). Under these
circumstances we show x 2 v(Snfig). Since x 62 OIMi(N; v), it holds x 62 v(S)−[j2Sv(Snfjg)
and together with the assumption x 2 v(S), we arrive at x 2 [j2Sv(Snfjg). In summary, so
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far we conclude, from x 2 v(S) (where i 2 S), that x 2 v(Snfjg) for some j 2 S. By repeating
the same procedure, step by step, there exists some k 2 Snfjg such that x 2 v(Snfj; kg) and
so on. Note that x 62 v(fig) because of the assumption x 62 OIMi(N; v). By repeatedly
applying the same procedure, there exists a coalition R  S not containing player i such that
x 2 v(R). Finally, from x 2 v(R), R  Snfig and the (tacitly assumed) monotonicity of the
set game hN; vi, we deduce that x 2 v(Snfig) as was to be shown. 2
3 An axiomatization of semi-marginalistic values for set games
The purpose of this section is to present an axiomatic characterization of any semi-marginalistic
value of the form (2.7). To be exact, we show that such a value is fully determined by the
global eciency (2.9) and the (tacitly assumed) substitution properties, as treated in Section
2, together with a type of monotonicity property. One out of two proof techniques is based
on the decomposition of any set game into a union of a new type of set games, called simple
set games. Concerning simple set games, the worth of any coalition equals either the empty
set or a singleton consisting of one arbitrary, but xed item.
Denition 3.1. Let  be a semi{marginalistic value of the form (2.7) assuming players’
contributions independence. We say the solution  possesses the marginalistic contributions
monotonicity property if
 i(N; v)   i(N;w) for all hN; vi 2 G, hN;wi 2 G, and all i 2 N , (3.1)
satisfying MCvS MCwS for all S  N with i 2 S, where the marginalistic contribution MC
is associated with  . In words, with respect to two dierent set games, the larger the player’s
marginalistic contributions in the game, the more items allocated to him.
Corollary 3.2. (cf. Lemmata 2.4 and 2.6).
Any semi{marginalistic value  of the form (2.7) assuming players’ contributions indepen-
dence, such that both (2.8) and (2.11) hold, satises the global eciency, substitution, and
the marginalistic contributions monotonicity properties.
Theorem 3.3. (Axiomatization) Consider the setting of Denitions 2.3, 2.5(ii) and 3.1(i).
There exists a unique solution on the set game space GN (with reference to a xed player set
N) satisfying the global eciency, substitution, and marginalistic contributions monotonicity
properties, and it is given by the semi{marginalistic value  of the form (2.7) based on players’
contributions independence.
The proof of Theorem 3.3 proceeds in three steps. The rst preliminary result provides an-
other interpretation of any semi{marginalistic value in that the value represents the maximal
solution satisfying the global eciency and marginalistic contributions monotonicity proper-
ties.
Proposition 3.4. If a solution  on GN satises the global eciency and marginalistic con-
tributions monotonicity properties, then the inclusion i(N; v)   i(N; v) holds for all hN; vi
and all i 2 N .
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Proof of Proposition 3.4.
Suppose a solution  on GN satises the global eciency and marginalistic contributions
monotonicity properties. Let hN; vi be a set game and i 2 N . In order to show the inclusion
i(N; v)   i(N; v), let x 2 i(N; v), but assume, on the contrary, x 62  i(N; v). Dene a new
set game hN;wi as follows:
w(S) :=
(
v(S)− fxg for all S  N with x 2 v(S);
v(S) for all S  N with x 2 U − v(S).
Notice that x 62 w(S) for all S  N . From this observation, together with the global eciency
(2.9) of  applied to the set game hN;wi, we derive the following chain of inclusions:
i(N;w)  [j2Nj(N;w) (2:9)= [SNw(S)  U − fxg Particularly, x 62 i(N;w).
Next we claim MCwS = MC
v
S for all S  N with i 2 S (where MCvS := v(S) − 5vS).
Consequently, i(N;w) = i(N; v) by the marginalistic contributions monotonicity (3.1) of
, but this equality contradicts the facts x 2 i(N; v) and x 62 i(N;w). This contradiction
completes the proof, provided we establish the claim above-mentioned.
Let S  N with i 2 S. We distinguish two cases. If x 62 v(S), then w(S) = v(S) and it holds
MCwS = w(S)−5wS = v(S)−5wS = v(S) −5vS = MCvS
If x 2 v(S), then w(S) = v(S) − fxg as well as x 2 5vS (because of the assumption x 62
 i(N; v)) and thus, it holds
MCwS = w(S)−5wS =

v(S)− fxg

−5wS = v(S)−5vS = MCvS
This completes the proof of the remaining claim. Further, this proof indicates that the global
eciency may be replaced by any weak form of global eciency, that is [j2N j(N;w) 
[SNw(S) for every set game hN;wi. In addition, the denition of the expression 5wS does
not matter so much. 2
The nal part of the preliminary results, for the sake of a rst proof technique of Theorem
3.3, deals with a particular type of set games, called simple set games, which will be treated
as the components of a decomposition for any arbitrary set game.
Denition 3.5. With every set game hN; vi 2 G and every x 2 U , there is associated the
simple set game hN; vxi 2 G dened to be
vx(S) :=
( fxg for all S  N with x 2 v(S);
; for all S  N with x 2 U − v(S).
(3.2)
The coalition S  N is said to be winning in the simple set game hN; vxi if vx(S) = fxg or
equivalently, x 2 v(S).
Proposition 3.6. (Decomposition results for set games and semi{marginalistic values)
Let hN; vi be a set game, x 2 U , and S  N . Recall MCvS := v(S)−5vS .
(i) v = [y2Uvy that is, v(T ) = [y2Uvy(T ) for all T  N . (3.3)
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(ii) The following equivalence holds: MCvxS = fxg () x 2MCvS (3.4)
(iii)  i(N; v) = [y2U i(N; vy) for all i 2 N and every semi{marginalistic (3.5)
value  of the form (2.7) assuming players’ contributions independence.
(iv) If a solution  on GN possesses the marginalistic contributions monotonicity property,
then it holds i(N; vx)  i(N; v) for all i 2 N and all x 2 U .
Proof of Proposition 3.6.
The decomposition statement (3.3) of the set game hN; vi is trivial since U = v(T )[

U−v(T )

for all T  N . The decomposition statement (3.5) of the semi{marginalistic value  of the
set game hN; vi is a direct consequence of the equivalence (3.4) because, for all i 2 N , it holds
[y2U i(N; vy) (2:7)= [y2U [SN;
S3i
MC
vy
S = [SN;
S3i
[y2U MCvyS
(3:4)
= [SN;
S3i
MCvS
(2:7)
=  i(N; v):
The statement in part (iv) is a direct consequence of the equivalence (3.4) too due to the
inclusion MCvxS  MCvS for all S  N with i 2 S, and all x 2 U . It remains to prove, for
every S  N , the equivalence (3.4) as follows.
MCvxS = fxg () vx(S)−5vxS = fxg
() vx(S) = fxg and 5vxS = ;
() x 2 v(S) and x 62 5vxS
() x 2 v(S) and x 62 5vyS for all y 2 U
() x 2 v(S) and x 62 5vS
() x 2 v(S)−5vS
() x 2MCvS
Concerning the fourth and fth equivalence in the above chain, we make use of the following
relationships: 5vS = 5([y2Uvy)S = [y2U5vyS , while vy(S) \ vz(S) = ; whenever y 6= z. 2
Proof of the uniqueness part of Theorem 3.3.
Suppose a solution  on GN satises the global eciency, substitution, and marginalistic
contributions monotonicity properties. Let hN; vi be a set game and i 2 N . We show
i(N; v) =  i(N; v). By Propositions 3.4 and 3.6 (iii)-(iv), the following relationships hold:
 i(N; v) = [y2U i(N; vy) as well as [y2U i(N; vy)  i(N; v)   i(N; v)
Fixing the set game hN; vi, player i and item x 2 U at beforehand, it suces to show
 i(N; vx) = i(N; vx) for every simple set game hN; vxi. (3.6)
The proof of (3.6) proceeds by induction on the number of winning coalitions in the marginal-
istic contributions set game hN;MCvxi, dened to be MCvx(S) := MCvxS for all S  N .
Coalition S is said to be winning in the set game hN;MCvxi if it holds MCvx(S) = fxg or
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equivalently, x 2 MCvS (see (3.4)). We distinguish two cases, whether or not there exists a
unique winning coalition.
Case one. Suppose there exists a unique winning coalition S1 in the set game hN;MCvxi,
that is MCvx(S1) = fxg and MCvx(S) = ; for all S 6= S1. Our rst claim is the following:
j(N; vx) =  j(N; vx) = ; for all j 2 NnS1. (3.7)
Indeed, for all j 2 NnS1, it holds, by denition of the set game, MCvxS = ; for all S  N
with j 2 S. From this, together with Proposition 3.4 applied to the simple set game hN; vxi,
we deduce the following chain of inclusions:
j(N; vx)   j(N; vx) (2:7)= [SN;
S3j
MCvxS = ; for all j 2 NnS1, and so, (3.7) holds.
Our second claim is the following: MC(MC
vx)
S = MC
vx
S for all S  N and thus,
j(N;MCvx) = j(N; vx) and  j(N;MCvx) =  j(N; vx) for all j 2 N . (3.8)
Indeed, if S 6= S1, then MCvx(S) = ; and so, MC(MC
vx)
S = ;. Otherwise, MC(MC
vx)
S1
=
MCvxS1 −5
(MCvx )
S1
= MCvxS1 since 5
(MCvx)
S1
= ; due to MCvx(T ) = ; for all T $ S1. >From
MC
(MCvx)
S = MC
vx
S for all S  N , together with the marginalistic contributions monotonicity
property for both  and  , it follows immediately that (3.8) holds.
The global eciency (2.9) for both  and  , applied to the set game hN;MCvxi, yields
[k2Nk(N;MCvx) = [k2N k(N;MCvx) which equals fxg, or equivalently,
[k2S1k(N;MCvx) = [k2S1 k(N;MCvx) which equals fxg,
since j(N;MCvx) =  j(N;MCvx) = ; for all j 2 NnS1. Note that any pair of players
in S1 are substitutes in the set game hN;MCvxi (since S1 is the unique winning coalition).
From the substitution property for both  and  , applied to the game hN;MCvxi, we derive
j(N;MCvx) = k(N;MCvx) as well as  j(N;MCvx) =  k(N;MCvx) for all j; k 2 S1. In
summary, the latter eciency equality simplies to j(N;MCvx) =  j(N;MCvx) = fxg for
all j 2 S1. From this and (3.7){(3.8), we conclude i(N; vx) =  i(N; vx) = ; if i 2 NnS1;
and, if i 2 S1, it holds i(N; vx) = i(N;MCvx) =  i(N;MCvx) =  i(N; vx). This completes
the proof of (3.6) if there exists one winning coalition in the game hN;MCvxi.
Case two. Suppose there are at least two winning coalitions in the set game hN;MCvxi, say,
among others, coalition S1. Particularly, it holds MCvx(S1) = fxg or equivalently, x 2MCvS1 .
Dene two new set games hN; v1i and hN; v2i, arising from the marginalistic contributions
game hN;MCvi such that v1 is almost the marginalistic contributions set game MCv and v2
almost the empty set game. To be exact,
v1(S) :=
(
MCvS for all S 6= S1;
; for S = S1;
(3.9)
v2(S) :=
( ; for all S 6= S1;
MCvS for S = S1.
(3.10)
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>From the descriptions (3.9){(3.10) of both set games, together with the equivalence (3.4),
we obtain that their associated simple set games hN; (v1)xi and hN; (v2)xi are given by
(v1)x(S) :=
(
MCvxS for all S 6= S1;
; for S = S1;
(3.11)
(v2)x(S) :=
( ; for all S 6= S1;
MCvxS for S = S1.
(3.12)
Note that, for all S  N , the inclusions (v1)x(S)  vx(S) and (v2)x(S)  vx(S) hold.
Concerning the marginalistic contributions in both simple set games, as given by (3.11){
(3.12), we claim the following:
MC
(v1)x
S1
= ; and MC(v1)xS = MCvxS for all S 6= S1; (3.13)
MC
(v2)x
S1
= MCvxS1 and MC
(v2)x
S = ; for all S 6= S1. (3.14)
In order to verify (3.13), for all S 6= S1, the following chain of equalities holds:
MC
(v1)x
S = (v1)x(S)−5(v1)xS
(3:11)
= MCvxS −5(v1)xS =

vx(S)−5vxS

−5(v1)xS
= vx(S)−5vxS = MCvxS
due to the inclusion 5(v1)xS  5vxS because of the inclusions (v1)x(T )  vx(T ) for all T $ S.
So, (3.13) holds. In order to verify (3.14), the following chain of equalities holds:
MC
(v2)x
S1
= (v2)x(S1)−5(v2)xS1
(3:12)
= MCvxS1 −5
(v2)x
S1
= MCvxS1
due to the equality 5(v2)xS1 = ; because of (v2)x(T ) = ; for all T $ S1. So, (3.14) holds too.
Clearly, it concerns a disjoint union in that MCvxS = MC
(v1)x
S [MC(v2)xS for all S  N . From
this we deduce the following chain of equalities:
 i(N; vx)
(2:7)
= [SN;
S3i
MCvxS = [SN;
S3i

MC
(v1)x
S [MC(v2)xS

=

[SN;
S3i
MC
(v1)x
S

[

[SN;
S3i
MC
(v2)x
S

(2:7)
=  i(N; (v1)x) [  i(N; (v2)x)
By (3.14), the marginalistic contributions set game hN;MC(v2)xi has a unique winning coali-
tion S1, whereas by (3.13), the collection of winning coalitions in the marginalistic contribu-
tions set game hN;MC(v1)xi is identical to the one in the initial marginalistic contributions
set game hN;MCvxi, except for coalition S1. The induction hypothesis (3.6) applied to both
set games hN; (v1)xi and hN; (v2)xi yields
i(N; (v1)x) =  i(N; (v1)x) as well as i(N; (v2)x) =  i(N; (v2)x)
Further, from the inclusion MC(v1)xS MCvxS for all S  N , together with the marginalistic
contributions monotonicity property for , we derive the inclusion i(N; (v1)x)  i(N; vx)
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and similarly, i(N; (v2)x)  i(N; vx). Finally, we conclude that the following chain of
inclusions holds:
 i(N; vx) =  i(N; (v1)x) [  i(N; (v2)x)
= i(N; (v1)x) [ i(N; (v2)x) (by the induction hypothesis)
 i(N; vx) (by the contributions monotonicity property of )
  i(N; vx) (by Proposition 3.4).
We arrive at the equality i(N; vx) =  i(N; vx). This completes both the inductive proof of
(3.6) and the full proof of Theorem 3.3. 2
Remark 3.7. Throughout the above proof of Theorem 3.3, for any set game hN; vi 2 G and
any coalition S  N , the associated expression 5vS is supposed to possess the following minor
property:
5wS  5vS whenever w(T )  v(T ) for all T $ S. (3.15)
In the context of the empty set game, (3.15) is meant to be read as5wS = ; whenever w(T ) = ;
for all T $ S.
4 A second proof of Theorem 3.3.
The second proof technique is based on the decomposition of any set game into a union of a
new type of set games, called elementary set games. Concerning elementary set games, the
worth of all coalitions, except one, equals the empty set. In fact, the decomposition technique
is mainly applied to the marginalistic contribution MC, as given by (2.7), the concept of
which is treated as a new set game arising from an initial set game.
Denition 4.1. (The marginalistic contributions set game and elementary set games)
(i) With every set game hN; vi 2 G, there is associated the marginalistic contributions set
game hN;MCvi 2 G dened to be
MCv(S) := MCvS = v(S)−5vS for all S  N . (4.1)
(ii) With every set game hN; vi 2 G, and every coalition T  N , T 6= ;, there is associated
the elementary set game hN;MCvT ET i 2 G dened to be
(MCvT  ET )(T ) := MCvT ; (MCvT  ET )(S) := ; for all S  N , S 6= T . (4.2)
Proposition 4.2. Consider the setting of Denition 4.1. It is tacitly assumed that, for all
S  N , (3.15) holds, that is 5wS  5vS whenever w(T )  v(T ) for all T $ S.
(i) MCv = [TNMCvT ET that is, MCv(S) = [TN(MCvT ET )(S) for all S  N .(4.3)
(ii) MC(MC
v)
S = MC
v
S for all S  N . (4.4)
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(iii) If a solution  on GN possesses the marginalistic contributions monotonicity property,
then it holds i(N; v) = i(N;MCv) for all i 2 N .
Proof of Proposition 4.2.
By (4.1){(4.2), the decomposition statement (4.3) of the marginalistic contributions set game
hN;MCvi is trivial. To prove (4.4), we claim, for all S  N , the following chain of equalities:
MC
(MCv)
S = MC
v(S)−5(MCv)S =

v(S)−5vS

−5(MCv)S = v(S)−5vS = MCvS ;
where the third equality holds because of the inclusion 5(MCv)S  5vS . The latter inclusion
is due to the fact that MCv(T )  v(T ) for all T $ S and all S  N . So, (4.4) holds. The
statement in part (iii) is a direct consequence of (4.4) and the marginalistic contributions
monotonicity property of the solution . 2
Lemma 4.3. Let C be an arbitrary, non-empty sub-collection of 2N not including the empty
set. With every set game hN; vi 2 G, there is associated a partially marginalistic contributions
set game hN;wCi 2 G dened to be wC := [T2CMCvT ET , that is
wC(S) :=
(
MCvS for all S  N with S 2 C;
; for all S  N with S 62 C. (4.5)
(i) Then the game hN;wCi is invariant under the MC{concept, that is MC(wC)S = wC(S)
for all S  N or equivalently,
MC
(wC)
S =
(
MCvS for all S  N with S 2 C;
; for all S  N with S 62 C.
(4.6)
(ii) If a solution  on GN possesses the global eciency, substitution, and marginalistic
contributions monotonicity properties, then it holds i(N;wC) = [T2C;
T3i
MCvT for all
hN; vi 2 G and all i 2 N .
Before we prove Lemma 4.3, we claim that both Proposition 4.2(iii) and Lemma 4.3(ii),
applied to the trivial collection C = 2N , complete the alternative proof of the main Theorem
3.3. Indeed, by (4.1) and (4.5), the choice C = 2N yields wC = MCv and so, for every set
game hN; vi 2 G, it holds
i(N; v) = i(N;MCv) = i(N;wC) = [T2C;
T3i
MCvT = [TN;
T3i
MCvT =  i(N; v) for all i 2 N .
We conclude  =  whenever the solution  on GN possesses the global eciency, substitution,
and marginalistic contributions monotonicity properties.
We say a player i is a destructive player in the set game hN; vi 2 G if v(S) = ; for all S  N
with i 2 S. A solution  on the set game space G is said to possess the destructive player
property if i(N; v) = ; for every destructive player i in the set game hN; vi. In words, a
destructive player receives no items. Obviously, any semi{marginalistic value  of the form
(2.5) satises the destructive player property, whereas, for any solution  on G the destructive
player property arises from the marginalistic contributions monotonicity property of  (with
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reference to the MC concept induced by  ) and the global eciency of  (applied to the
empty set game).
Proof of Lemma 4.3.
(i) Let S  N . If S 62 C, then wC(S) = ; and so, MC(wC)S = ;. In case S 2 C, then we claim
the following chain of equalities:
MC
(wC)
S = wC(S)−5(wC)S = MCvS −5(wC)S =

v(S) −5vS

−5(wC)S = v(S)−5vS = MCvS ;
where the fourth equality holds because of the inclusion 5(wC)S  5vS. The latter inclusion is
due to the fact that wC(T )  v(T ) for all T $ S and all S  N . So, (4.6) holds.
(ii) Suppose a solution  on GN satises the global eciency (GEF ), substitution (SUBS),
and marginalistic contributions monotonicity (MCMON) properties. Fix the set game hN; vi
and player i 2 N . We show, by induction on the number jCj of coalitions in the collection C,
that it holds
i(N;wC) = [T2C;
T3i
MCvT for all sub-collections C of 2N . (4.7)
Case one. Suppose, for the moment, jCj = 1, say C = fTg. By (4.5), wC(T ) = MCvT and
wC(S) = ; for all S  N with S 6= T . The global eciency of  yields [j2Nj(N;wC) =
[SNwC(S) = MCvT . On the one hand, any pair of members of T are substitutes in the game
hN;wCi and consequently, SUBS of  yields j(N;wC) = k(N;wC) for all j; k 2 T . On
the other, non-members of T are destructive players in the game hN;wCi and consequently,
the destructive player property DESP of  yields ‘(N;wC) = ; for all ‘ 2 NnT . Notice
that DESP follows immediately from MCMON together with GEF (applied to the empty
set game). So far, in case C = fTg, we conclude j(N;wC) = ; for all j 2 NnT and
j(N;wC) = MCvT for all j 2 T . So, (4.7) holds.
Case two. From now on, we may suppose jCj  2. We distinguish three subcases.
Subcase one. Suppose i 2

[S2CS

−

\S2CS

. Dene the collection Ci := fS 2 C j i 2 Sg.
By assumption, the strict inclusion Ci $ C holds and so, the induction hypothesis applies to
the new collection Ci, yielding
i(N;wCi) = [T2Ci;
T3i
MCvT = [T2C;
T3i
MCvT
Thus, it remains to show the equality i(N;wC) = i(N;wCi) and for that purpose, it suces,
by MCMON of , to show MC(wC)S = MC
(wCi)
S for all S  N with i 2 S. The latter equality
is a direct consequence of Lemma 4.3(i) (applied to both collections C and Ci respectively),
by taking into account that, for every S  N with i 2 S, the equivalence S 2 Ci () S 2 C
is valid. So, (4.7) holds.
Subcase two. Suppose i 2 \S2CS, that is i 2 S for all S 2 C. Take any S 2 C. By
applying Lemma 4.3(i) to both collections C and the one-element collection C := fSg,
we obtain the inclusion MC(wC)S  MC(wC)S for all S  N . Now MCMON of  yields
i(N;wC)  i(N;wC) for all C = fSg, where S 2 C. On the one hand, for the one-
element collection C = fSg, it holds, as shown in case one, i(N;wC) = MCvS (since
i 2 S for all S 2 C). So far, we conclude the following chain of inclusions:
[S2CMCvS = [S2CMCvS = [S2Ci(N;wC)  i(N;wC)
13
On the other hand, the global eciency of  yields another chain of inclusions:
i(N;wC)  [j2Nj(N;wC) = [SNwC(S) = [S2CMCvS
All together, we conclude i(N;wC) = [S2CMCvS = [S2C;
S3i
MCvS, where the latter equality is
due to the assumption i 2 \S2CS. So, (4.7) holds.
Subcase three. Suppose i 62 [S2CS, that is i 62 S for all S 2 C. We claim i(N;wC) = ;
since player i turns out to be a destructive player in the set game hN;wCi. Indeed, for all
S  N with i 2 S, it holds S 62 C and so, wC(S) = ;. As in case one, recall that DESP
follows immediately from MCMON together with GEF (applied to the empty set game).
This completes the inductive proof of (4.7). 2
Remark 4.4. The proof technique used throughout this section is similar to the one used by
[1] to establish the very same axiomatization of the IM{value on the class of monotonic set
games, with the understanding that the role of their so-called unanimity set games is replaced
by our elementary set games. For the sake of a uniform treatment of a family of solutions for
set games, the unanimity set games turn out to be much less applicable than the elementary
set games.
5 Concluding Remarks.
The axiomatization of semi{marginalistic values for set games, as stated in Theorem 3.3, can
be considered, more or less, as the counterpart of Young’s axiomatization of the Shapley value
for cooperative games. In order to elucidate these similarities between the two elds of set
game theory and cooperative game theory, let us briefly summarize the basic concepts from
the latter eld.
A cooperative game with transferable utility (TU) is a pair hN; vi, where N is a nonempty,
nite set and v : 2N ! R is a characteristic function, dened on the power set of N , satisfying
v(;) := 0. Let CG denote the space of all cooperative TU-games with an arbitrary player set.
An element of N (notation: i 2 N) and a nonempty subset S of N (notation: S  N or
S 2 2N with S 6= ;) is called a player and coalition respectively, and the associated real
number v(S) is called the worth of coalition S, to be interpreted as the earnings (in the utility
of money) its members can attain by mutual cooperation among themselves. Concerning the
solution theory for cooperative TU-games, a single-valued solution  on CG associates a single
payo vector  (N; v) = ( i(N; v))i2N 2 RN with every cooperative game hN; vi 2 CG. The
payo  i(N; v) to player i in the cooperative game hN; vi represents an assessment by i of
his gains from participating in the game. We say a single-valued cooperative game solution
 satises the eciency principle if it holds
P
i2N  i(N; v) = v(N) for all hN; vi 2 CG. The
substitution property for  on CG is fully in accordance with Denition 2.5. Further, a single-
valued cooperative game solution  on CG is said to satisfy the strong monotonicity property
if it holds  i(N; v)   i(N;w) for all hN; vi 2 CG, hN;wi 2 CG, and all i 2 N , satisfying
v(S)− v(Snfig)  w(S)− w(Snfig) for all S  N with i 2 S. In [12], it is shown that there
exists a unique solution on the cooperative game space CGN (with reference to a xed player
set N) satisfying the eciency, and strong monotonicity properties, and it is given by the
well-known Shapley value Sh(N; v) = (Shi(N; v))i2N 2 RN as follows (cf. [9], [8]):
Shi(N; v) =
X
SN;
S3i
(jSj − 1)!  (jN j − jSj)!
jN j! 

v(S)− v(Snfig)

for all i 2 N ,
14
where jSj denotes the size (cardinality) of coalition S. For a detailed introduction about
cooperative game theory, we refer to [4]. In summary, the main Theorem 3.3 concerning
semi{marginalistic values for set games has been inspired by Young’s axiomatization for the
Shapley value, although their proofs dier very much. The counterpart of the Shapley value
may be stated, at rst glance, to be the individually marginalistic IM{value, as given by (2.1),
but, from the viewpoint of the potential approach to the solution theory, it is justied to be
the Driessen{Sun DS{value as given by (2.4) (cf. [5]). In addition, the semi{marginalistic
value  of the form (2.7) by choosing 5vS := \j2Sv(Snfjg) (cf. [11]), may be interpreted as
the counterpart of the solidarity value for cooperative games (cf. [7]).
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